Shocked
The biggest losers from a hard landing in China would be its Asian neighbours. China accounted, on average, for almost half of the total export growth of the other East Asian economies last year. By some estimates, Japan's exports to China and capital spending linked to its export industries accounted for one-third of Japan's total GDP growth last year. Indeed, a slowdown in China would expose the chronic weakness of private consumption in Asia. The recent burst in growth in the region has been much too dependent on exports to China. Although Japan's GDP grew at an annual rate of 4.5% in the second half of 2003, consumer spending rose by only 1%. In South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, consumer spending fell slightly, on average, last year.
A slump in China would have a much smaller impact on America and Europe, but some companies would be hurt. Exports to China accounted for about one-fifth of total export growth last year in America and the European Union. However, the biggest risk to these economies lies elsewherein the indirect effect of a sharp slowdown in China on financial markets. Another risk lies in the fact that America depends on China to help finance its budget and current-account deficits. China's purchases of American Treasury bonds, along with purchases by Japan, have helped to hold down yields and hence American mortgage rates. If China's economy continues to overheat, its current-account surplus could soon turn to deficit, and then its central bank would no longer need to buy American Treasuries to hold down its currency.
Fortunately, there are some reasons to hope that avoiding a hard landing in China, despite the difficulties, is possible. This time China's policymakers are stepping in to cool things down earlier than they did in the early 1990s, when inflation was far higher and investment and credit were growing even faster than today. And unlike the East Asian countries which suffered so badly during their economic crisis in the late 1990s, China has a current-account surplus and little foreign debt.
Perhaps the biggest worry for the world economy is the prospect of a twin tightening of monetary policy in both China and America. Interest rates of 1% in the United States are dangerously low for an economy with 5% real GDP growth. If America's Federal Reserve is forced to raise rates more rapidly than expected and this happens at about the same time that China's economy slows sharply, stockmarkets would take a beating and global growth could stall. Monetary-policy announcements from Beijing are still not as important as the Delphic words of Alan Greenspan, the Fed's chairman. But as the weight of China's economy in the world continues to grow over coming years, one day they will be.