charlequin said:
It's the implicit backdrop to your argument below: "360 isn't winning, so it can't possibly be doing the best at thing X."
You misunderstood my words then. I fully agree with you that the 360 has had a better 3rd-party strategy than the Wii, even though the Wii is selling more 3rd-party software. As you said, the battle is close (right now), and different metrics can be used to come to different results in a close battle. Ultimately, I suspect that the Wii will eventually open up a pretty sizable gap in 3rd-party sales over the 360, and at that point I would probably have to give the nod to the Wii, but as of right now - yes, the 360 has had the better strategy even though it is currently selling less 3rd-party software.
What I was saying was that I find it incredibly difficult to imagine a scenario wherein a system's strategy could be called the best EVER, of all time, when it couldn't even produce the best results in it's own current battle. In that case, those metrics better be off-the-charts fucking blow-your-ass-away incredible.
charlequin said:
Well, you didn't address my point about metrics. There are lots of ways that 360 can potentially be winning by metrics that a potential third-party developer would consider (average per-title sales, sales in relation to budget, projected sales boost from co-marketing, etc.) that wouldn't be reflected in total software sales numbers. It's possible to explain the 360's consistent lead in third-party development through stubbornness or irrationality, but it's also possible to assume that some of these factors are in play and greenlighting a 360 game is in some sense "better" than greenlighting a Wii game in a vacuum.
Well, are we talking about successful 3rd-party strategies for the actual 3rd-parties, or successful 3rd-party strategies for the home console manufacturer? Because it sounds like you are talking about successful strategies that benefit the 3rd-parties as your metrics, if those are the primary indicators that you are using. In that case, we have to start breaking it down to each individual publisher. What strategy was the best ever for EA? Or Activision? Or Koei? Or Square-Enix? And that is a much broader and more complicated discussion that I really have no interest in getting into.
If we are talking about successful 3rd-party strategies for the console manufacturer, then the primary goals for the manufacturer are to use a successful 3rd-party strategy to help sell systems, increase marketshare, and produce profitability. The metrics you listed are secondary indicators which can be used to try to judge a comparison between two strategies which produced fairly similar results. They are primary indicators for the 3rd-party publishers, but they are secondary indicators to the console manufacturer. The primary goals for the console manufacturer are ultimately related to marketshare and profitability.
charlequin said:
There's also a context issue in play. Sony's third-party strategy was almost unquestionably the most effective, because they brought it into play at the right moment: there was a huge well of discontent with Nintendo, and Sony had the technical tools (i.e. optical media) to cut devs a huge deal.
Now we seem to be at the crux of the dispute between us. You admit that Sony's strategy was almost unquestionably the most effective. And I submit that results matter. A lot. That is why these strategies are in place. To produce results. At the end of the day, that is the ultimate barometer by which the effectiveness of a business strategy is judged. Did the strategy work? Did it produce the desired results?
In Sony's case with the PS1, the results speak for themselves. Phenomenal hardware sales, a virtually complete assemblance of all relevant 3rd-party efforts in that generation, a clear marketshare victory, and a very profitable generation for Sony.
We have to wait a few more years to judge the final results for the 360, but I'll go out on a limb and say that the 360 won't be the marketshare leader in any major market (not even close), there will be a sizable and significant number of quality 3rd-party properties which will be released on other systems but never make it to the 360 (or come over very late to the 360), and Microsoft will absorb a hefty and significant loss over the life of the 360.
The 1st-party efforts are roughly similar in overall effect on both the 360 and PS1. The star of the show on both systems is the 3rd-party output, and Sony achieved far better results with the PS1 than Microsoft did with the 360.
Now throw in the fact that the 360 is currently already losing the 3rd-party software sales battle to its own competitor (Wii) in North America, is quite possibly losing the 3rd-party software sales battle to both of its competitors (PS3, Wii) in Europe, and is definitely losing the 3rd-party software sales battle to both of its competitors (PS3, Wii) in Japan. And the 360 will likely lose the 3rd-party software sales battle to the Wii by a significant margin in North America by the end of the generation. I just don't see any rational means for stating that the 360 has had a better 3rd-party strategy than Sony did with the PS1. Especially when you admit yourself that Sony's 3rd-party strategy was almost (I personally wouldn't add the word 'almost') unquestionably the most effective. What is the point of a strategy if not to produce results?
charlequin said:
Microsoft's strategy is just a refinement of Sony's; they're using the same basic tools but they've done a slightly better job overall in identifying good pick-ups and building ongoing relationships, and they don't have quite as much cross-interference between different regional HQs. But Sony's PSX third-party strategy was paired with an excellently-priced system going up against anemic competition, whereas Microsoft paired its strategy to an overpriced system with terrible reliability that's up against the Wii juggernaut.
You use things such as the 360 being overpriced and unreliable as excuses for the 360. I suggest that these are important components of the 3rd-party strategy.
Setting your price at a consumer-friendly level is a very important aspect of a 3rd-party strategy if you want 3rd-parties to feel comfortable knowing that they will have a significant userbase to sell to. Making your hardware reliable is also an important aspect of your 3rd-party strategy. Again, this relates to the size of the userbase, and the ability of those customers to have a functioning system for which they can buy games - which relates directly to 3rd-party interests. The fact that Microsoft messed up these two aspects tells me that Microsoft dropped the ball on these two aspects of their 3rd-party strategy. They aren't excuses to be dismissed in order to allow Microsoft to be able to lay claim to the best 3rd-party strategy ever - they are in fact failed components of the 360's 3rd-party strategy.
Likewise, Sony choosing to switch over to optical media for the PS1 is not an excuse to be used to deny Sony the claim to best 3rd-party strategy ever. In fact, Sony's choice of optical media was a huge and vitally important piece of Sony's 3rd-party strategy. And it is a big part of why Sony's PS1 had a more effective 3rd-party strategy than the 360.
charlequin said:
I think the real sticking point for me here is that I don't actually see any reason that effectively courting third parties would have had to detract from any of Nintendo's numerous positive steps with the Wii. Third party relations are generally dealt with by a separate division within a company compared to managing first-party development (and I think there's lots of wiggle room between where Wii's 3rd party support is now, and the point at which it starts to interfere with 1st party titles' success), and Nintendo is not operating in a cash-limited or deficit-spending situation in which they are unable to afford an increase in expenditure on worthwhile tasks.
Generally speaking, I'm not disagreeing with you. Yes, it would have been preferable for Nintendo to have pursued a (financially tenable) 3rd-party strategy which would have worked out better than the strategy with which they started this generation.
In an ideal scenario, they would have put just as much energy and passion into developing their 3rd-party strategy as they did with developing the controls, or the design and pricing of the Wii, or the 1st-party software strategy for the first 18 months of the Wii, or the marketing strategy for the Wii, etc. But life doesn't work that way. In real life, an overarching strategy is conceived wherein priorities are placed, and some things get more focus and attention than others.
Nintendo conceived their overarching strategy for the Wii, and looking at it now 2.5 years into it, all of the primary business goals for the Wii have been achieved, and even greatly surpassed. In that context, the strategy has worked better than could have ever been hoped for. So going back and trying to nitpick particular elements of the strategy seems counterproductive. Change the focus on the 3rd-party element of the strategy, and it is quite likely that the focus on another element of the strategy would have been reduced. And I would suggest that many of the other portions of the strategy were far more important in the Wii's success than the 3rd-party strategy.